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In the movie Ocean’s Twelve, two protagonists represent two very 
different ways to receive a complex story: You can try very hard to 
interact mentally – and fail on a more or less high level (like ‘Linus 
Caldwell’); or you can fake a mental interaction and assure just after the 
twist of the story that you already knew it (like ‘Bruce Willis’). In the latter 
case – and if the fake succeeds – you will be objectively clever and 
participate in the benefits of the people who really knew it – whether they 
exist in reality or not. This special variation of interpassivity is not only a 
more or less lame game for the reception of postmodern movies: There 
are hints enough to assume that the Middle High German literature 
strongly promoted interpassive cleverness. And for the courtly audience 
of a medieval literary performance, the showmanship was way more 
important than for the audience of a today’s movie. So, medieval 
narratives gave the opportunity of two complementary games of 
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reception: Interactive engaging and interpassive participating. The prize 
for both games is ‘courtly merriment’, a fundamental condition to be part 
of the court. These games of reception of collectively received narratives 
shall be shown using the example of Gottfrieds von Strassburg Tristan 
and other medieval narratives.  
 
1. An autopoietic game manual: Ocean’s Twelve and Bruce Willis’ 
interpassive cleverness  
In Steven Soderbergh’s 2004 blockbuster Ocean’s Twelve,1 the master-
thief François Toulour challenges the team of noble villains around 
Danny Ocean: Whoever will be able to steal a certain Fabergé Egg will 
be admitted to be the most significant thief ever. Stupidly, Danny Ocean 
and most of his friends are arrested during the preliminary stages by 
Europol. So, the badly decimated team calls Danny’s wife Tessa to join 
them: Though she’s not a master-thief at all, she has a significant 
similarity to the famous movie star Julia Roberts, who’s actually 
expecting a baby. And that’s the plan: Tessa will play the pregnant Julia 
Roberts who wants to get a private presentation of the Fabergé Egg; 
while admiring the precious item, Tessa shall fake a sudden feeling of 
faintness, and during the expectable fuss, the rest of the team wants to 
substitute the jewel with an imitation. Unfortunately, Tessa meets Bruce 
Willis in the museum, who is a special friend of Julia Roberts. Tess tries 
hard to perpetuate the cheat during her very nervous small-talk with 
Bruce Willis, and the movie has the opportunity to show a few minutes of 
a knockabout comedy. Finally, Tess is unmasked – however, not by 
Bruce Willis, but rather by the Europol agent Isabel Lahiri, who appears 
like a deus ex machina in order to show up the fraud. The only part of 
Bruce Willis regarding the detection of the role play is to stand back 
watching and to assert: “I knew it. Shame on you”2. 
 
With this scene, for the time being, the movie demonstrates an 
interactive reception of a fictional work of art, in this case: a crime movie. 
The character ‘Bruce Willis’ is the only one in Ocean’s Twelve who 
actually is played by himself: The fictional character ‘Bruce Willis’, in a 
manner of speaking, is identical to the real person Bruce Willis; hence he 





can bridge between the fictional world, where the story happens, and the 
real world, where the movie is watched. He operates as a spectator, 
copied into the film out of real world, who plays the game in a seemingly 
interactive manner: He observes the spectacle of Tessa playing Julia 
Roberts, and he also takes part of this action – at least marginally; he 
seems to collect clues for solving the intrigue (if you want to recognize 
increasing insight in his stone-faced countenance), and finally, he claims 
success of interpretation.  
 
 An evidence for this autopoietic perspective is ‘Willis’’ statements 
regarding his movie The Sixth Sense3, just before ‘Julia Roberts’ turns out 
to be a fraud. First, ‘Willis’ is addressed by Linus Caldwell, the youngest of 
Ocean’s team: 
 
Caldwell:  I loved it, but I figured it out. [Caldwell regards to the 
famous twist in the movie: The character Willis is 
playing finally figures out that he is a ghost] 
Willis:  Not a lot of people did. That’s pretty amazing. 
Caldwell:  The second that she doesn’t talk to you in the  
   restaurant, I knew... 
Willis:  You figured that out, hu? 
Caldwell:  Yeah. I mean, the movie still totally works for me.  
Willis:   Great. 
 
Just a few seconds later – ’Willis and ‘Julia Roberts‘ are standing in front 
of the Fabergé Egg – a watchman addresses ‚Willis‘ analogously:  
 
Watchmen:  The moment that she doesn’t talk to you in the  
    restaurant, I knew. 
Willis:   Your friends didn‘t tell you? 
Watchman:  No. 
Willis:   That’s when you figured it out, huh? 
Watchman:  Yeah. But the movie was still enjoyable for me. 





Willis:  Okay. Thanks. [beside, to Tess, playing Julia Roberts] If 
everybody’s so freakin‘ smart, how come the movie 
did $675 million worldwide – theatrical!4 
 
Well, Willis objectively is a “freakin‘ smart” spectator – in contrast to 
his audience: From the very first moment he sees ‘Julia‘, he watches 
narrowly, asking questions about the private life of Julia Roberts (which 
Tess isn’t able to answer in a convincing way) and, first and foremost, he 
always shows a stone-faced countenance with a clever, little smile. 
Anyway, he is the star from Die Hard, so we want to believe him when he 
finally says that he knew that Tess wasn’t Julia Roberts. Sometime 
before, his stone-faced little smile must have been indicated the very 
moment he knew. Most likely. 
 
 There is only one disfigurement: Tess actually is Julia Roberts in 
the meaning that the character of Tess Ocean – playing ‘Julia Roberts‘ – 
is played by the actress Julia Roberts.  
 
 This offers two perspectives onto the scene: From a naive point of 
view, observing only the act ‘Willis’ is probably “freakin’ smart”. But from a 
reflected point of view, observing the observation of the act, ‘Willis’ didn’t 
get the point (in opposite to Willis, who surely had a lot of fun blaming 
Julia Roberts for playing Julia Roberts). If you include the reflected point 
of view, there is reasonable doubt regarding the cleverness of ‘Bruce 
Willis’: Just before the twist, he addresses Tess as Julia (as cited above), 
and his intimate message from movie star to movie star proves that he 
really thinks that he’s talking to his friend (what he actually does, 
certainly, but just not within the fictional reality). And right after the twist 
he flirts with the Europol agent Isabel Lahiri (performed by Catherine 
Zeta-Jones) in a very dumb way: “Do you really have a boyfriend? Or 
were you just ... was that just part of the whole thing with them?“ (Isabel – 
or Catherine? – ignores him completely). By the way: Flirting actually is 
the only verifiable interaction of ‘Bruce Willis’ during his complete cameo: 
The first shot shows him flirting with a beautiful stranger; he sees ‘Julia’ 





walking by and mumbles “Julia...”. His counterpart answers, a little bit 
offended: “My name is Teresa!”.  
 
 Regarding flirting, ‘Willis’ is a very interactive spectator – but 
regarding cracking the case, he actually is not interactive at all, 
respectively he interacts just too late with his phrase “I knew it!”. Isabel 
Lahiri doesn’t need any of the suspicious little mistakes of Tess during 
her flirt with ‘Willis’ in order to detect the cheat. For this story working, 
‘Willis’ cameo could have been cut out completely. It is much more 
plausible for the fictional character ‘Willis’ that his investigating 
interaction is only faked. But objectively, he comes off the scene as a 
“freakin’ smart” person. With his “I knew it!”, he takes part of the 
cleverness of Isabel Lahiri, who definitively knew about the truth from the 
very first moment she saw ‘Julia Roberts’. And ‘Bruce Willis’ shows us 
how the trick works: You have to put on a little knowing smile, you have 
to act like you observe close – but don’t show too much differentiated 
mimic! – and – most important – you have to claim that you knew the 
truth the soonest possible after clarification. Regarding his ‘own’ movie, 
The Sixth Sense, ‘Willis’ mirrors this special way of Interpassivity: It is 
possible that actually now one belongs to the group of people who really 
knew about the real nature of Malcolm Crowe as a ghost before the twist 
in the movie – but by appropriate behaviour, everyone can take part of 
the delegated enjoyment: You can objectively show yourself as a clever 
interpreter without interpreting cleverly. And from an outside point of 
view, it is not differentiable whether or not you were intellectual 
interactive.  
 
 But the movie Ocean’s Twelve would not be as autopoietic as 
asserted earlier if this special phenomenon of interpassivity would 
remain in the movie: The plot as a whole is constructed as an unsolvable 
riddle. There are several twists, and all of them are definitively 
unpredictable because the spectators get too less information even to 
get irritated in the right way, not to mention to solve the unseen riddles. 
For example, the head of Europol turns out to be the mother of Linus 
Caldwell, a member of the Ocean’s team – well, we didn’t get any hint 





before the twist that her identity is questionable. So, we get the 
information that there is a riddle to solve just while it’s solved. And after 
the twist a lot of unsolved questions emerge regarding this solution. This 
is the principle of all the twists in Ocean’s Twelve. The confusion and 
misunderstanding of the spectator of the movie is also copied into the 
movie: Linus Caldwell, the youngest team member, is constantly shown 
trying hard to understand the plans of Danny and Rusty, the leaders of 
the smart team. He wants to join in the game, but he understands almost 
nothing. This cumulates in a scene where Danny and Rusty take Linus to 
meet Matusi, a very delicate contact and somehow inevitable for 
whatever plan. They talk in riddles, and Linus tries to become interactive:  
 
Matsui:     So, business? 
Danny Ocean:  Business. 
Rusty Ryan:   A doctor, who specializes in skin diseases, will 
 dream he has fallen asleep in front of the television. 
Later, he will wake up in front of the television, but not 
remember his dream. 
Matsui:   [to Caldwell] Would you agree? [Caldwell is visibly 
perplexed and perturbed, shaking his head] 
Danny Ocean:  If all the animals along the equator were capable of 
flattery,  then Thanksgiving and Hallowe'en... would 
fall... on the same day. 
Rusty Ryan:  Mm. 
Matsui:  Yeah. Hey. Uh-huh. Uh-huh. 
Matsui:   When I was four years old, I watched my mother kill a 
spider... with a teacosy. Years later, I realised it was 
not a spider - it was my Uncle Harold. 
Linus Caldwell:  [All eyes turn to him, expectantly] Oh, let the sun 
beat down upon my face, stars fill my dreams. [Ryan claps hand 
across eyes] I am a traveller in both time and space, to be where I 
have been. [Blank, yet stern, looks from everyone. Cut.] 
Linus Caldwell: [Outside, Ryan and Ocean join Caldwell in the street] 
Is he alright? Are we alright? 
Rusty Ryan:  Kashmir? 





Danny Ocean:  Is that your idea of making a contribution? 
Rusty Ryan:  We hadn't even started. We ain't even got to the terms 
   yet. 
Danny Ocean:  We came this close to losing that. 
Linus Caldwell:  Hey, I don't even understand what happened in  
     there. What did I say? 
Danny Ocean:  You called his niece a whore. 
Rusty Ryan:  A very cheap one. 
Linus Caldwell:  What? 
Danny Ocean:   She's seven.5 
 
Later on, the mother of Linus has to enlighten her clueless son that 
Danny, Rusty and Matusi just played a prank on him named “Lost in 
Translation” – and Linus only complains about his inability to figure out 
such stuff. This proves that the artificial complications of understanding 
the simple plot of the movie aren’t accidents but intention. The movie 
ensures hereby that actually no one could belong to the group of 
spectators who really are understanding the plot in real-time. And with 
the characters Linus and ‘Bruce Willis’, it offers two different ways of 
reaction: You can, like Linus, try very hard to get interactive, quoting lyrics 
from Led Zeppelin6 in order to get in touch with a miraculous plot – and 
you will suffer from misunderstanding. Or you can play the game 
interpassively like ‘Bruce Willis’ – and you will belong to the group of 
spectators which doesn’t exist actually, but which enjoys the reputation 
of being “freakin’ smart”.  
 
2. Receiving the medieval narration like Linus or ‘Bruce Willis’: The 
long way or a shortcut to become an “edelez herze” 
It is not a big surprise that a paradigmatic postmodern movie like 
Ocean’s Twelve fits perfectly to the theorem of interpassivity, which was 
formed by Robert Pfaller, disputing the reception of art within the 
postmodern period. For the academic perspective of historic humanities, 
it is of great interest whether interpassivity has the potential to explain 
pre-modern phenomena of processes of reception, too. First experiments 
already have shown that indeed applying interpassivity to medieval 





literature could be fruitful.7 So, in the following, I will try to apply the 
special principle of interpassivity by bluffing interactivity to the reception 
of medieval epics.  
 
 Certainly, in a first step, it has to be clarified to what extent the 
reception of a postmodern movie would be comparable with the 
reception of a medieval romance. Even though medieval literature 
seems to be a completely different medium compared to a movie. 
However, the special condition of medieval literature makes it similar to a 
movie: its performance and its collective reception. In distinction from 
modern literature, medieval narratives were performed in front of a group 
of spectators. Due to their minor capabilities in writing and reading, the 
noble members of courtly society principally needed performers to read, 
recite, scan, or even sing the epics they wanted to hear.8 And the 
situation of collective reception is mirrored in hundreds of autopoietic 
passages of medieval literature. Surely, these passages are only literarily 
shaped echoes from historical processes of reception, not the reception 
itself – equally to the postmodern film, where we regularly are confronted 
with autopoietic scenes reflecting the performative reception of the 
current movie.  
 
 Due to the detective story as a basic narrative being unknown 
during the Middle Ages, the great goal for a ‘prosperous’ reception of 
epics wasn’t to solve a riddle or to check the twist before its happening. 
Instead, the aim basically was to turn out to be perfect in ethical regard: 
Courtly literature told stories of courtly and uncourtly phenomena, 
behavior and persons, and within the differentiation of courtliness and 
uncourtliness, it formed a virtual sphere for its courtly spectators to 
identify with. In the prologues of epics, one can find concrete concepts of 
courtliness by evolving an ethical program. For example, the courtly 
romance Iwein by Hartmann von Aue from about 1190 begins its 
prologue with an ethical postulation, adjunct to King Arthur, and the 
promise of gratification if you follow: 
 





Swer an rehte güete / wendet sîn gemüete, / dem volget saelde 
und êre. / des gît gewisse lêre / künec Artûs der guote, / der mit 
ritters muote / nâch lobe kunde strîten. (VV. 1-7; translation: He who 
turns his mind to true goodness will be attested by happiness and 
honour. Good King Arthur, who knew how to fight laudably and 
chivalrously, gives clear proof of this.)9 
 
The courtly literature is only for courtly people, who are able to 
receive it properly, as the prologue of the short novel Der Borte (The Belt) 
emphasizes:  
 
Ich bin der Borte genant, / hubschen luten sol ich sin bekant, / den 
argen sol ich vremde sin, / si sullen immer liden pin / durch ir 
missewende / unz an ir bitter ende. / man sol mich hubschen luten 
lesen, / di sullen mit mir vrolich wesen / durch ir tugent manicfalt, / 
wan nieman siner tugent engalt. (VV. 1-10; translation: I am called 
‘The Belt’, and I shall be known by noble people. The rascals shall 
never know me; they shall forever suffer in pain due to their disgrace 
until to their vicious end. I shall be read to noble people, and they 
shall be merry together with me due to their many virtues because 
no one suffers through his virtues.)10 
 
If you are virtuous, you are able to receive the story (who is talking 
itself within the prologue) in a merry manner (which is a basic courtly 
performance and not only a spontaneous expression of emotion at the 
medieval court)11 and, consequently, you belong to the noble people. And, 
the other way around, the text makes very clear what the prize is for 
those who can’t receive it in a proper way: If you aren’t virtuous, you 
aren’t able to receive the story and you will suffer in eternity instead.  
 
In this case, the apparently intended interaction is comparatively 
obvious, if you want to play the game in the mould of Linus: You have to 
receive the upcoming story in ‘courtly merriment’, which is the 
comprehensive programme of ‘hoher muot’ in Middle High German. 
‘Hoher muot’ is the unity of internal virtue and external egregiousness 





and means in particular joyful proud, dignity, confidence, and high 
spirits.12 The poets of courtly literature praise the actions that are leading 
to this attitude, and through the performers, the attitude reaches the 
audience.13 This complex circle is reflected by the prologue of The Belt. 
Well, getting into the right mood could have been pretty difficult, 
spectating the actual story of The Belt: After all, it confronts the noble 
audience with a noble lady, betraying her husband at the first 
opportunity, becoming a mighty knight magically and beating the very 
knight who had overcome her husband earlier on. In the end, even a 
pseudo-homosexual scene with the knightly transmuted lady and her 
former husband is shown – perhaps exactly this was the great interactive 
goal for a medieval audience: To keep face facing a very questionable 
story and to keep “hohen muot” considering the crass and queer goings-
on.  
 
 Surely, we don’t have the opportunity to observe directly what 
concrete interactions operationalized “hohen muot” in the Middle Ages; 
but perhaps we get comparable impressions if we look at the audience 
of a modern film premiere: Here, the audience isn’t constrained to have 
“hohen muot” but to have a good time, to be curious, to be best informed, 
and to chat spirited about the movie in special or movies in common.  
 
One of the most complex ethical programmes is evolved in the 
prologue of Gottfried’s von Straßburg courtly romance Tristan. And here 
you can see the difficulties of a proper interactive reception of Middle 
High German courtly literature at its best – and also the shortcut to the 
award of “hoher muot”.  
 The narrator outlines very clear the audience, for whom he 
versified the romance: 
 
Ich hân mir eine unmüezekeit / der werlt ze liebe vür geleit / und 
edelen herzen z’einer hage, / den herzen, den ich herze trage, / der 
werlde, in die mîn herze siht. / ine meine ir aller werlde niht / als die, 
von der ich hoere sagen, / diu keine swaere enmüge getragen / 
und niwan in vröuden welle sweben. / die lâze ouch got mit 





vröuden leben! / Der werlde und diseme lebene / enkumt mîn rede 
niht ebene. / ir leben und mînez zweient sich. / ein ander werlt die 
meine ich, / diu samet in eime herzen treit / ir süeze sûr, ir liebez leit, 
/ ir herzeliep, ir senede nôt, / ir liebez leben, ir leiden tôt, / ir lieben 
tôt, ir leidez leben. (VV. 45-63; translation: I have undertaken a labour 
to please the polite world and solace noble hearts – those hearts 
which I hold in affection, that world which lies open to my heart. I do 
not mean the world of the many who (as I hear) are unable to 
endure sorrow and wish only to revel in bliss. (Please God to let 
them live in their bliss!) What I have to say does not concern that 
world and such a way of life; their way and mine diverge sharply. I 
have another world in mind which together in one heart bears in 
bitter-sweet, its dear sorrow, its heart’s joy, its love’s pain, its dear life, 
its sorrowful death, its dear death, its sorrowful life).14 
 
Like in The Belt the romance is dedicated exclusively for a special 
audience. But it is not only a noble audience to distinguish it from an 
uncourtly group of people: Both groups – the “edelen herzen” and the 
‘normal world’ – have the possibility to have “hohen muot”, the courtly 
form of being happy. But whilst the ‘normal world’ has “hohen muot” in a 
simple, dualistic differentiation from feeling unhappy, the “edelen herzen” 
have a dialectic concept of “hoher muot”, which combines pain and 
felicity. Therefore, the minimum requirement for a ‘valid’ spectator 
regarding the following story the right way is to feel unhappy – and this is 
a requirement of emotional interactivity: The story of Tristan and Isolde 
tells about courtly, unhappy people, stuck together in love and pain, 
gaining “hohen muot” in the paradoxical combination of courtly love and 
uncourtly infidelity. The dialectic concept of “hoher muot” shall be a tight 
allegiance between the story and its reception – and the award for the 
group of ‘valid’ spectators, the emotional interactive “edelen herzen”: 
 
der hân ich mîne unmüezekeit / ze kurzewîle vür geleit, / daz sî mit 
mînem maere / ir nâhe gênde swaere / ze halber senfte bringe, / ir 
nôt dâ mite geringe. (VV. 71-76; translation: I have offered the fruits 
of my labour to this world as a pastime, so that with my story its 





denizens can bring their keen sorrow half-way to alleviation and 
thus abate their anguish). 
 
This is the quasi curative effect from an intense and interactive 
interpretation of a lovesick story by a lovesick spectator:  
 
ein senelîchez maere / daz trîbe ein senedaere / mit herzen und mit 
munde / und senfte sô die stunde. (VV. 97-100; translation: Let a 
lover ply a love-tale with his heart and lips and so while away the 
hour). 
 
Anyway, this medicine is bought dearly, because it requires from the 
“edelen herzen” an emotional involvement characterized by fundamental 
paradox:  
 
diz leit ist liebes alse vol, / daz übel daz tuot sô herzewol, / daz es 
kein edele herze enbirt, / sît ez hie von geherzet wirt. / ich weiz es 
wârez alse den tôt / und erkenne ez bî der selben nôt: / der edele 
senedaere / der minnet senediu maere. (VV. 115-122; translation: 
This sorrow is so full of joy, this ill is so inspiring that, having once 
been heartned by it, no noble heart will forgo it! I know as sure as 
death and have learned it from this same anguish: the noble lover 
loves love-tales). 
 
Well, in a mere emotional meaning, this interactive programme isn’t 
as difficult as it may sound at the first: Suffering from a sad love-story and 
enjoying it – this is mutatis mutandis comparable to many modern 
collectively receptions of a romantic movie. If we think of Baz Luhrmann’s 
William Shakespeare’s Romeo + Juliet from 1996 or James Cameron’s 
Titanic from 1997, it is obvious that having pleasure from suffering, feeling 
good whilst crying and sobbing isn’t really difficult for the right people – 
let’s call them “edele herzen” for the time being.  
 
But the special conceptualisation of “hoher muot” formed within the 
idea of the “edele herzen” is not solely an emotional challenge but also a 





philosophical one: Tristan and Isolde, the happy, suffering lovers in the 
story, are both standing out due to comprehensive education. And this 
education – talking several languages, playing chess, being polite in 
various circumstances, cutting up meat in a very courtly way for example 
– is strongly linked to the concept of the “edelen herzen”. This coherence 
of “edele herzen”, “hoher muot”, and comprehensive education you can 
see plainest within the musical education Isolde receives from Tristan: 
Already a highly gifted musician before her education through Tristan, 
Isolde’s music goes strictly to the hearts of the “edelen herzen” after 
Tristan teaching her in an arcane art named “morâliteit”. 
 
ir meister der spilman / der bezzerte si sêre. / under aller dirre lêre / 
gab er ir eine unmüezekeit, / die heizen wir morâliteit. / diu kunst diu 
lêret schoene site. / dâ solten alle vrouwen mite / in ir jugent 
unmüezic wesen. / morâliteit daz süeze lesen / deist saelic unde 
reine. (VV. 8000-8009; translation: Her tutor, the minstrel, much 
improved her. Together with all this instruction Tantris engaged her 
in a pursuit to which we give the name of Bienséance, the art that 
teaches good manners, with which all young ladies should busy 
themselves. The delightful study of Bienséance is a good and 
wholesome thing). 
 
Surely: It remains pretty unclear, what exactly „morâliteit“ should be 
– beyond the impression that it is strongly linked with courtly education. 
Anyway, due to her new skills, Isolde reaches the “edelen herzen” 
through her musical performances:  
 
si sanc in maneges herzen muot / offenlîchen unde tougen / durch 
ôren und durch ougen. / ir sanc, den s'offenlîche tete / beide 
anderswâ und an der stete, / daz was ir süeze singen, / ir senftez 
seiten clingen, / daz lûte und offenlîche / durch der ôren künicrîche 
/ hin nider in diu herzen clanc. / sô was der tougenlîche sanc / ir 
wunderlîchiu schoene, / diu mit ir muotgedoene / verholne unde 
tougen / durch diu venster der ougen / in vil manic edele herze 
sleich / und daz zouber dar în streich, / daz die gedanke zehant / 





vienc unde vâhende bant / mit sene und mit seneder nôt. (VV. 8113-
8132; translation: She sang openly and secretly, in through ears and 
eyes to where many a heart was stirred. The song which she sang 
openly in this and other places was her own sweet singing and soft 
sounding of strings that echoed for all to hear through the kingdom 
of the ears deep down into the heart. But her secret song was her 
wondrous beauty that stole with its rapturous music hidden and 
unseen through the windows of the eyes into many noble hearts 
and smoothed on the magic which took thoughts prisoner 
suddenly, and, taking them, fettered them with desire!). 
 
Analogous to the prologue, Isolde‘s recital splits the audience into 
two parts, and both of them are courtly. But only the “edelen herzen” have 
the possibility to interact emotionally in a paradoxical way: pleasure and 
grief. After all, the narrator gives his audience a direct invitation to interact 
strongly regarding the concept of “morâliteit”: 
 
ir lêre hât gemeine / mit der werlde und mit gote. / si lêret uns in ir 
gebote / got unde der werlde gevallen. / s'ist edelen herzen allen / 
ze einer ammen gegeben, / daz sî ir lîpnar unde ir leben / suochen 
in ir lêre. / wan sîne hânt guot noch êre, / ezn lêre sî morâliteit. (VV. 
8010-8019; translation: Its teaching in harmony with God and the 
world. In its precepts it bids us please both, and it is given to all 
noble hearts as a nurse, for them to seek in her doctrine their life 
and their sustenance. For unless Bienséance teach them, they will 
neither prosper nor win esteem). 
 
“Morâliteit” is the midwife and the nurse of the “edelen herzen”, wo if 
you also learn it, you can actively work on your capabilities to be part of 
the exclusive group of the “edelen herzen”.  
 
 Unfortunately, the concrete meaning of “morâliteit” remains 
obscure after all. However, it isn’t helping matters that Gottfried von 
Straßburg coins the term “morâliteit” as a neologism, neither today nor 
for a contemporary audience: The broad discussion of the concrete 





meaning of the term in today‘s research might be only a faint echo from 
equivalent efforts in the Middle Ages.15 Gottfried gives his audience hints 
enough, but he also makes a clear identification of “morâliteit” impossible 
and every concept questionable. Again, this point makes the Tristan 
comparable with Ocean’s Twelve: The piece of art aggravates its 
interactive interpretation artificially. If you want to play the game ‘Tristan’ 
in the fashion of Linus you will have analogue problems compared to his 
failure regarding Ocean’s Twelve. And the doubtful concept of “morâliteit” 
is only one small part of ensemble of intellectual riddles the Tristan 
assigns to its spectators if they want to be an “edelez herze” in the 
philosophical meaning of the term: Like modern research a medieval 
spectator surely could spend a lot of energy to decode the “Minnegrotte” 
(a typological cave with a mysterious lock)16, to understand Petitcreiu (a 
magic, multicoloured dog, whose little bell banishes all pain)17, to relive 
Tristan’s confusion considering Isolde Weißhand (another Isolde Tristan 
falls in love with in a way)18, all of them examples for the many confusing 
riddles within the Tristan, which all are strongly bound to the concept of 
the “edelen Herzen”.  
 
 Surely, this is a very attractive intellectual exercise – but it also 
means a mountain of work to do with high confidence to remain 
haphazardly like Linus. But why working so hard, if you are able to 
partake of the benefits of a successful Linus without mental acrobatics? 
If you play the game like ‘Bruce Willis’, you only have to fake mental 
interactivity. That is to say: You have to look intelligent and contemplative, 
you have to nod sometimes, perhaps you have to exchange thoughtful 
glances with other spectators – but don’t do too much, it is better to keep 
a stony face basically than to act in the false moment; and, first and 
foremost, you have to acknowledge whatever the narrator presents as 
doctrine, clue, or explanation as if you knew all just before. And if there 
are enough other spectators who act like you, you belong to the group of 
“edele herzen”, although they might not exist in reality. It is critical that 
you can’t distinguish mental interactivity and the interpassive fake of it 
from an external perspective: If you act convincing, you objectively are an 





“edelez herze” – even if you are daydreaming during the literary 
performance.  
 
 If we look closely, we can discover this objective impact of an 
interpassive reception of narration also in The Belt: In order to belong to 
the noble people, technically speaking, you only have to remain sitting 
also after the prologue. For an interpassive person, the speech of the 
personalized narration in the prologue (“I am called ‘The Belt’, and I shall 
be known by noble people” etc.) rather is a promise than a claim:19 If you 
only remain sitting you objectively will belong to the group of noble and 
virtuous people. A true mental interaction is maybe delightful but not 
necessary. However, there’s just one snag: When there is objectively no 
difference between real and faked mental interactivity, its signs are 
always questionable. This fundamental scepsis leads to a second layer 
of the game: In addition to faking mental interpassivity, you can validate 
the appropriate signs from the rest of the audience. Whom do you 
believe his or her participation to the group of insiders and whom not? 
The internal differentiation of the courtly audience sketched in the 
prologues hereby is mirrored on the level of reception. 
 
 True, such quite questionable processes of reception are usually 
not thematised within the courtly romances which are obligated to a 
courtly idealism. Fortunately, it is the function of the farce to reflect also 
dubious ways of reception. Here we find some pointers to interactive and 
interpassive acts of reception.  
 
 Nothing less than a warning of overly interactive reception gives 
the narrator in Hartmann’s von Aue courtly romance Erec: In a farcical 
passage the narrator, who calls himself “Hartmann”, trades barbs with a 
virtual spectator of the literary performance. The reason is a depiction of 
a horse’s saddle the narrator commences to tell his audience. In this very 
moment the spectator interrupts and asks if he could describe the saddle 
in place of the narrator. ‘Hartmann’ authorises him for the time being, and 
the virtual spectator does his very best. ‘Hartmann’ annotates his efforts, 
at first feigned approving and after that more and more sarcastically. In 





the end, the interactive spectator remains as a fool and ‘Hartmann’ snubs 
him to leave narrating to the narrator: The experiment of interactive 
narration turned out to be a complete flop.20 
 
 The farce Der Wiener Meerfahrt (The travel over sea by citizens of 
Vienna) presents a whole group of interactive spectators and exposes 
them as complete morons: Some citizens of Vienna are drinking too 
much wine and tell each other stories including the tale of a trip to 
Jerusalem. More and more they obsess over the idea and finally they 
think that they are really travelling over sea to the Holy Land. They read 
their dizziness due to their drunkenness as heavy swell and even reenact 
the biblical plot of Jonas: One passed out drunk is considered a sinner 
who is responsible for the asserted tempest and his friends are throwing 
him into the sea in order to moderate it. In reality, the drunk is thrown 
onto the street, where he receives great injury. Not until the next day they 
sober up and realize that they acted like complete morons by receiving 
the narration of the travel to the Holy Land interactively.21  
 
 These two examples only problematized an interactive reception 
of narration but didn’t thematised an interpassive way. In a manner of 
speaking, courtly interpassive reception of a piece of art is in the centre 
of one episode of The Stricker’s farce romance Der Pfaffe Amis (Father 
Amis):22 Amis, a cunning trickster, goes to the Parisian court and 
impersonates himself as a famous painter. He claims that he will paint 
the walls of a hall with astonishing pictures that only could be seen by 
persons who were born in wedlock. After a prosperous price negotiation, 
Amis resides in the hall for six weeks while doing absolutely nothing. 
After that, the king and then his vassals are entering the hall and all of 
them are praising the asserted pictures as masterpieces although no one 
can see a single brushstroke. Fearing the loss of honour and feud, 
everyone wants to join the group of fascinated spectators and acts 
appropriately:  
 
Ir ietslicher hette gesworn, / si sehens alle untz an in. / So jach er 
allez nach in, / er sehez uzer mazen wol. Do was mancher zornes 





vol / gegen siner muter umbe daz, daz si sich niht hette beguotet 
baz. / Do siz allez wol besahen / und offenlichen jahen, / die arweit 
wer wol bewant, / da begonde der meister sazehant / zu dem 
kunege urloubes gern / und bat sich sines gutes wern. (VV. 714-726; 
translation: Every one of them would have been sworn that 
everybody would see it except himself only. So, he repeated 
everything after them and said that he would see it as exceeding 
beautiful. A lot of people were angry there about their mother that 
she didn’t take care of herself better. After they had observed 
everything and officially asserted that the work was well done, the 
master [Amis] bid farewell to the king and asked after paying off). 
 
The fraud is successful and Amis can leave the court as a rich and 
honoured man. Here, we have a whole court which fakes interactivity in 
order to participate interpassively in the benefits of the group of 
interactive spectators: The noble audience performs with pointing, 
discussing, praising, and paying an enjoyment of art which doesn’t really 
exist. And he noble knights even acclaim the magic phrase which also 
uses ‘Bruce Willis’:  
 
Do si den kunich horten jehen, / da stunde daz und ditz hie, / als in 
der meister wizzen lie, / do sprachen si alle ‘iz ist also’ (VV. 708-711; 
translation: After they heard the king saying this and that would be 
painted there (like Amis had told him before), they said all: ‘even so’). 
 
The faked interactivity relieves the knights and the king from being 
bastards and the loss of feud. They are participating interpassively in a 
group of others, which definitively doesn’t exist. But surely, the very 
winner of this interpassive act of reception is Amis himself, who acts like 
a narrator, explaining verbosely his inexistent pictures. In the end, he is 
the most interpassive person: As a narrator he is of course very busy but 
as a painter he does absolutely nothing. And exactly this inaction is the 
key of an artistic (and, not to forget, financial) success he never would 
have had if he had done only one brushstroke.  
 





 A successful interpassive participation of a whole audience to a 
not really existing interaction shows the wide-spread farce concerning a 
disputation between Romans and Greeks. The story is documented since 
the 12th century. I refer to the concise version of Johannes Pauli from the 
16th century under the title Ein Nar überdisputiert ein Witzigen (A moron 
conquers a sage).23 The story is situated at the founding of Rome: The 
Romans ask the Athens for their constitutional order which they want to 
adopt also for Rome. The Athens agree on the condition that the Romans 
can provide their wisdom in the context of a disputation. Due to 
language difficulties, the disputation shall proceed using hand gestures. 
The Romans arrange the disputation in an interpassive manner:  
 
Da die Römer das horten, da legten sie einem Narren ein kostlichen 
hübschen Rock an und satzten im ein hübsch rot hoch Baret uff. 
Und ob es Sach wer, das der Kriech sie überwünd, so het er nicht 
mee dan ein Narren überwunden; und wer es aber Sach, das der 
Nar den von Athenis überwünd, so hetten die Römer alle 
überwunden. (translation: After hearing that the Romans dressed 
the moron with a fine frock-coat and donned him a fine high berret. 
If the Greek would overcome them, he would have overcome 
nobody but a fool; and if the moron would overcome the Athenian, 
the Romans would have overcome everybody). 
 
The disputation begins and both opponents are misunderstanding 
each other completely. For example, the Greek rises his open hand to 
show that everything is obvious in the eyes of God. The moron thinks that 
the Greek wants to slap him and he rises a clenched fist in order to 
threaten more. The Greek, however, interprets this sign as a pointer to the 
might of God and his power to hide all his plans from our eyes. So, in the 
end the Greek accepts the mental superiority of the Romans:  
 
Also erkant der Kriech von Athenis, das sie würdig weren das 
Gesatz zů empfahen; wan sie hetten gelerte Leüt zů Rom, dieweil 
diser Nar stil schweig und nit ret. Da achtet in der Kriech von 
Athenis für ein weisen, hochgelerten Man; het er aber geret, so het 





er gleich wol gesehen, was er für ein Man wer gewesen. Als noch 
hützůtag sich vil Ratherren des gebruchen. (translation: So, the 
Greek from Athens realized that they were merit to get the 
constitutional order. Because they had savant people in Rome due 
to the moron not talking. Therefore, the Greek from Athens thought 
him a wise and studious man; but if he would have been talking the 
Greek would have recognized what a man he was. Today, still a lot 
of councilmen do so). 
 
The mentally interactive Greek fails and the interpassive Romans 
win a disputation which has never happened before. The Romans are 
profiteers of the benefits of a very clever communication which didn’t 
proceed. And in the end Johannes Pauli emphasizes the fundament of 
this trick: The moron didn’t talk, as well as ‘today’ a lot of councilmen do. 
When you don’t communicate too much – like ‘Bruce Willis’ and unlike 
the foolish spectator in Hartmann’s Erec – you become a projection 
surface for wisdom. And the Romans are participating in this projected 
wisdom although it’s an illusion. They don’t believe in their mental 
superiority or even equality regarding the Greek, but they delegate this 
belief to a naive moron who thinks that until the end he has advantage of 
his Greek antagonist.24 The Romans don’t cherish an illusion: They have 
chosen the moron themselves, they know that he is a dumb person, and 
they did it with shrewdness (cf. the forelast quotation).  
 
The delegation is perfect: No matter what happens, the Romans will 
be the winner. Explicitly, the Romans and not the moron will be the 
profiteers. Subjectively, the Romans are only shrewd; but objectively, they 
are wise, so they get the Greek constitutional order. This is significant: In 
the end the Romans are objectively wise, and this is not only a 
misinterpretation of the Greek. The Romans participate also 
interpassively in the Greek’s political wisdom which becomes a 
permanent benefit: At first, the Roman wisdom is fake, but it finally forms 
reality. By delegating the disputation to the naive moron the Romans 
absolve themselves from the stupidity the moron is characterized with.25 
 





3. The endeavor of a systematisation: Passive, interactive, and 
interpassive ways of approach to collectively received 
narratives 
Regarding (medieval) literature and its reception interpassivity is a 
widespread phenomenon.26 Within this contribution, only a small, special 
variety is subject: Interpassive participation in the benefits of faked 
mental interactivity whilst a collective reception.  
 
 At first, it is necessary to emphasize from a literary point of view 
that there is no ‘passive’ reception of narratives. It is a delusion from the 
interactivity-turn of the 90’s that the ‘normal’ reception of art leads to a 
passive attitude and that it would be a primarily goal of contemporary art 
to force the audition to cooperate in a performative way regarding the 
completion of art. From a hermeneutic point of view every reception of a 
piece of art is mentally active in the sense of contributing 
preunderstanding and interrelating information; and from a performative 
point of view, the same is true of the performance of reception, which 
means the active generation of mimic, gesture, breathing, maybe 
commentary. As is generally known, Robert Pfaller created the theorem 
of Interpassivity by criticizing the claim of interactivity.27 Doing this, the 
theorem of Interpassivity inherited in a way the questionable 
differentiation of a passive and an active model of reception. Especially 
for the situation of collectively received narratives we have to record that 
this differentiation either makes no sense or has to be refilled. Against this 
backdrop, a passive reception would be no reception as such but a fail: 
To receive a narrative passively means being in the situation of reception 
without actual reception. For example, this would be the case when you 
sit in a movie but you are woolgathering instead of perceiving the film. 
And an active reception, properly speaking, would be always interactive if 
you talk about collectively received narratives: The multifarious actions of 
an audience – be it in a movie or in a stage play or in a performance of a 
medieval narrative – belong naturally to the performative piece of art as 
theater studies emphasizes for decades. Instead of differentiating only an 
active and a passive way of reception in order to describe interpassivity, 
it is useful to differentiate the (inter-)active reception further on: With 





Niklas Luhmann, you can divide a first order observation from a second 
order observation. A first order observer observes the piece of art, but this 
means that he or she can’t observe himself or herself observing the piece 
of art. Luhmann calls this phenomenon of essential blindness the ‘blind 
spot’ of every observation. A second order observer observes the 
observation of the piece of art, be it concrete in form of looking to a friend 
laughing about a scene or more abstract in form of including the layers 
of citation, intertextuality, topics, or differentiated perspectivisations in the 
reception. The specific blindness of observation is also valid for the 
second order observer, but he or she is able to see the blind spot of other 
observers he or she observes.28  
 
 It seems that the special variation of interpassivity I want to sketch 
out here is a complex form of a second order observation which looks 
like a first order observation: You can’t observe yourself observing the 
narration; but you can observe other spectators observing you observing 
the narration. And this works also in case if the first order observation 
didn’t occur in the narrower sense. Instead of spectating the narration 
closely and with a high mental engagement (first order observation) you 
have to watch out for signs of intended ‘interaction’ and also for the 
reactions of the other spectators and act accordingly. In this respect, this 
special version of interpassivity can be very interactive, but just not 
regarding the piece of art itself. When the communication succeeds – in 
other words: When the other spectators are second order observers, who 
attest you an appropriate first order observation due to your ‘interactions’ 
– you are profiteer of the benefits of the group of highly engaged first 
order observers (which don’t have to exist actually). That means you are 
objectively clever if you watch a crime movie; you are objectively 
empathetic if you watch a love story; you are an “edelez herze”, if you 
receive the Tristan; and you belong objectively to the courtly people, if 
you take part of a performance of The Belt. 
 
 However, this interpassive observing of someone’s observation of 
your own observation is a dangerous game: Every action you perform in 
order to approve your adequate first order observation might be 





perceived as a sign of fake or misunderstanding. Accordingly the cited 
sources are emphasizing the term ‘passivity’ in ‘interpassivity’: It seems to 
be necessary to give only few, but best placed indications of mental 
interactivity. So, between observing the narration, observing the other 
spectators observing the narration and observing the other spectators 
observing the own observation, a very complex game develops which 
interferes and infuses the original game ‘understanding the narration’. In 
a manner of speaking, we can talk about a first order game 
(‘understanding the narrative’) and a second order game (‘self-
presentation of understanding the narrative’).  
 
4. Playing the game(s) of collectively reception: It’s a kind of 
magic 
For a post-modern point of view, this might sound ridiculous. Surely, we 
all know showoffs and self-exposer and the most of us practiced the 
interpassive participation in the benefits of a group of wiseacres now and 
then in school, when we indicated understanding in Maths with all the 
others without understanding. But these practices seem marginal to us 
and not significant for a model of reception of narratives. Today, the first 
order game is the essence and the second order game are irrelevant 
and little bit deviant appendices.  
 
 It seems to me that, the other way around, in the Middle Ages the 
second order game was the essence of the literary game. And there are 
a lot of reasons making this assume plausible: At the medieval court 
image cultivation was a crucial ingredient of culture. In opposite to a 
modern civil society the medieval estatist society was not based on the 
principle of equality but on the overt aspiring after egregiousness. 
Narratives weren’t part of a fully differentiated entertainment industry but 
a pivotal part of courtly lifestyle and self-concept. The farce of Amis as a 
painter gives us an idea how serious the games of art reception were 
played.29 Because the medieval narratives were performed principally, the 
initial situation of interactive and interpassive approach to collectively 
perceived narratives is given basically. And since we have no 
differentiation between (illuminated) ‘stage’ and (unlit) ‘auditorium’ within 





courtly performances of literature, the spectators are also exhibited for 
observation and naturally part of the performance (already before any 
interaction). Only in the written form, in which the medieval literature 
came down to us, this comprehensive performative dimension got lost.  
 
It is crucial for the social importance of the literary game(s) that the 
court in the High Middle Ages – especially the German court – wasn’t 
already a fixed institution. In narratives models of court could be virtually 
simulated, while the real court was acting itself, for representation being 
the actual way of existing of the court.30 “Hoher muot”, for example, was a 
phenomenon which fluctuated between fictionality and reality and 
likewise did other courtly virtues like honor, loyalty, and courtly love.31 Ralf 
Schlechtweg-Jahn has already worked out that particular Gottfried’s 
Tristan presented with its “edele herzen” a virtual mirror for the actual 
court, searching for its true identity.32 Against this background it is 
inevitable to involve the audience’s passivity, activity, and interpassivity 
shown above in a historical meaning of literature performance: Everyone 
present contribute the literature performance, but everyone also plays his 
or her own game. The medieval literature regularly addresses this literary 
double game as complex and anything but harmless: It seems very 
plausible that receiving courtly narratives was an appealing and thrilling 
art form by itself – and the specific variation of interpassivity sketched 
above seems to be a very welcome shortcut in order to make the 
complex game playable without exhaustion. Almost always medieval 
courtly narratives are giving many hints for an adequate reception, be it 
in the form of didactical explanations or in form of basal (The Belt) 
respectively more complex manners (Tristan) which shall bring the 
courtly spectator to light. This ‘service’ of propositions for interpassive 
shortcuts aren’t coincidence or the effect of very friendly poets: Courtly 
literature is always commissioned literature, contracted by the court and 
fitted to its necessities. The narratives which are formed in this setting, 
work regularly quasi magical by leveling up the court objectively 
(compare The Belt): You only have to stay, be quiet and let the 
performance go on in order to be part of an exclusive society by 
definition. In parallel, the narratives also give the opportunity of an 





internal differentiation of a courtly and an even more courtly group 
(compare Tristan).  
 
 This magic operates on the basis of interpassivity: If you are 
sending the relevant signs you will belong to an ideal social group whose 
real existence is always questionable. In Middle High German literature 
this group of the others often has the form of a frenchified comity. At the 
time of Gottfried’s Tristan the French courtoisie was the core culture the 
German courts aspired after.33 The Middle High German courtly literature 
was a leading medium for this pursuit because as a rule German 
narratives were transmissions from French stories – Gottfried’s Tristan for 
example is an adaptation of an old French romance by Thomas 
d’Angleterre. By receiving the Middle High German version the German 
nobles had the opportunity to participate in the French culture without 
really being part of this commendable social group. Therefore Middle 
High German literature has a fundamental interpassive disposition: 
Whilst commissioning German adaptations from French courtly 
narratives the German court takes interpassively part in the French 
culture. The active part in terms of an intense pursuit of the (literary) 
French culture takes the poet who is payed to adopt the narrative. Within 
this interpassive scope the Middle High German narratives offer two ideal 
typical ways of reception, two sorts of literary games: On the one hand 
the German nobles can take part in the offered sketch of frenchified 
courtoisie with a great deal of mental interactivity (first order game); the 
complexity of the courtly patterns developed within the narratives give 
ample opportunity for intense mental interaction. Or, on the other hand, 
the courtly people can participate interpassively by performing the 
appropriate indications of a sensible reception (second order game). In 
this case the narrator34 does all the mental work vicariously and he gives 
his audience frequently hints for a proper interpretation of the story and 
signs for an appropriate performance of reception.  
 
 However, this differentiation is ideal-typical. In reality, we have to 
assume blending of the two literary games and switching between them. 
This interpassivity is a very active one, and the passage to interactivity is 





fluent. This means that interpassivity in form of faked interactivity is not 
necessarily a fraud: Switching between mental interpassivity and 
interactivity, the audience is also oscillating between acting insights and 
having insights. The real magic is that interpassive participation can lead 
to factual participation at any moment like the story of the Romans 
disputation shows impressively: Surely, the wisdom of the Roman’s was 
a fake at first, but whilst faking wisdom, they get the codified wisdom of 
the Greeks actually –  
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